How low will drug companies go to protect their intellectual property empire? We knew they would sue South Africa, the epicenter of the global AIDS pandemic, to prevent comparison shopping for cheaper versions of brand name drugs (parallel-importation case 1998-2001). We knew that they would sue Indian the pharmacy of the poor, to try to ease legal standards to make getting pharmaceutical patents for minor variations of existing medicines even easier (Novartis v. India, 2006-2007). And now we know that they will go even lower and withdraw pending registration applications for essential life-saving medicines and boycott sales of all new medicines in Thailand because Thai leaders dared to issue a lawful compulsory license on a crucial, but over-priced AIDS medicine, Kaletra (Abbott, March 13, 2007). Abbott's abrupt decision to withdraw seven pending registration applications, including one for a new heat-stable form of Kaletra, and its threat to make Thailand a no-drug zone for all new Abbott medicines is a truly appalling example of corporate hubris. (The six other drugs are the painkiller Brufen; an antibiotic, Abbotic; a blood clot drug, Clivarine; the arthritis drug Humira; the high-blood pressure drug Tarka; and the Kidney disease drug, Zemplar.) After touting itself to the be the engine of new life-saving discoveries, Abbott is now willing to withhold medicines altogether in order to extract even greater intellectual property concessions from developing countries. Abbott falsely claims that Thailand has "broken patents and ignored the patent system" when it issued its compulsory license. To the contrary, Thailand has used a completely lawful flexibility under the WTO TRIPS Agreement to issue compulsory licenses permitting non-commercial use of essential medicines within its public health system. Abbott continues its unfettered, high mark-up sales to rich Thai consumers and to medical tourists who can afford higher price medicines in the private health care delivery system. Moreover, Abbott is scheduled to receive royalties on sales made to the public sector. Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement permits Thailand to issue a public, non-commercial use license without prior negotiations, but Thailand had in fact engaged in protracted but fruitless price negotiations with Abbott. Instead of negotiating, however, Abbott has unilaterally offered to sell Thailand Kaletra at its fixed middle-income tiered company price, $2200/patient/year, a price that is 440% higher than the cost price Abbott offers to African countries and more than five times as much as what will be charged by generic producers once there are sufficient economies of scale and competitive generic markets. In order to provide alterative, life-saving anti-retroviral therapy to the steady stream of patients who develop drug-resistence or suffer undue adverse side effects from first-line therapies, Thailand determined that it would have to find a cheaper source of supply. Thus, it issued a compulsory license on Kaletra, as it had on another AIDS medicines, efavirenz, and on a cardiovascular medicine, Plavix. Some industry pundits and Pharma allies in Congress wonder whether Thailand is planning a wholesale assault on the patent system by granting compulsory licenses for everything from erectile dysfunction drugs to patented facial creams. Addressing these concerns, Thailand has publicly announced strict criteria that will guide its compulsory licensing policy and has established a Subcommittee to implement the Government Use of Patents. The published criteria would limit compulsory licenses to drugs and medical supplies that are listed on the National Essential Drug List or that are necessary to solve important public health problems, to address emergencies or matters of extreme urgency, to prevent and control the outbreak of epidemics or pandemics, or to save lives. Accordingly to an additional criterion, Thailand will seek government use licenses only when the price of the particular medicine is too high to be affordable. Applying these criteria, Thailand estimates that it will only consider licenses for fewer than 15% of medicines - hardly a wholesale assault on the patent system. It would be bad enough if Abbott's product withdrawals affected its innovator products only, especially if there are not therapeutic equivalents available. But, there is the additional risk that by withdrawing the registration packets Abbott will succeed in preventing or delaying the registration of generic equivalents by making it harder for Thai drug regulators to confirm the safety and efficacy of the equivalent. Because drug regulatory agencies often rely upon or refer to originator data to grant marketing approval for follow-on products, this option is now moot. Hopefully, Thai regulator will be able to rely on the original Kaletra registration packet or on published data to support registration of new generic heat-stable versions of Kaletra, but this option is by no means certain. This new tactic by Abbott in Pharma's war for profits exceeds all previous tactics. It directly violates the universal human right of access to essential medicines. It directly violates both the letter and the spirit of the Doha Declaration. It directly violates any conceivable norm of corporate responsibility. It is in fact the equivalent of a tactical nuclear device dropped into the middle of 580,000 people living with HIV/AIDS IN Thailand. How low is too low - Abbott has let us see the Pharma abyss.